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 “NO EXISTIRA LA PENA DE MUERTE”:  
DOES THE UNITED STATES VIOLATE 
REGIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW BY 
IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY ON 
CITIZENS OF PUERTO RICO? 
INTRODUCTION 
n July 31, 2003, after three days of deliberations, a San 
Juan jury composed of seven men and five women ended 
the federal trial that set off a clash between the United States 
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.1  The defendants, Hec-
tor Oscar Acosta-Martinez (a.k.a “Gordo”) and Joel Rivera-
Alejandro were acquitted of the charges of abduction and mur-
der of Jorge Hernandez-Diaz, a grocery-store owner.2  The two 
men faced a penalty of death in the first capital trial in Puerto 
Rico in more than seventy-five years.3  
Puerto Rico effectively abolished the death penalty in 19294 
and later incorporated the prohibition in its constitution, which 
was ratified by the U.S. Congress in 19525 and states: “The 
Death Penalty shall not exist.”6  Despite this prohibition, the 
Department of Justice continues to seek the death penalty in 
cases arising under the jurisdiction conferred to it by the Fed-
eral Death Penalty Act of 1994 and the “Memorandum of Un-
derstanding” between the local authorities and the local United 
States Attorney’s office.7 
  
 1. John-Thor Dahlburg, Acquittals Quash a US Bid for Death Penalties in 
Puerto Rico, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2003, at A24; Leonard Post, A Clash of Cul-
tures, THE NAT’L LAW J., July 23, 2003.  
 2. Dahlburg, supra note 1.  
 3. The last time the death penalty was applied in Puerto Rico was in 1927 
when a man was hanged for the murder of his boss.  Ivan Roman, Not-guilty 
Verdict Thwarts Death Penalty Battle: The Case had Sparked a Fight about 
whether Federal Law on Capital Punishment Trumps Puerto Rico’s Ban on it, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 1, 2003, at A3. 
 4. 34 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 995 (1929).  
 5. Pedro A. Malavet, Puerto Rico: Cultural Nation, American Colony, 6 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 33 (2000). 
 6. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7 (“No existirá la pena de muerte.”).  
 7. United States v. Acosta Martinez, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311, 312 n.1 (D. P.R. 
2000) [hereinafter Acosta Martinez I] (citing Rory K. Little, The Federal Death 
 
O 
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To place the present controversy in context, Part I of this note 
consists of a discussion of the evolution of the political relation-
ship between the United States and Puerto Rico, as well as 
Puerto Rico’s ban on capital punishment. Part II discusses the 
Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994.  Part III examines in detail 
the recent challenges to the applicability of the death penalty to 
Puerto Rico by defendants Acosta-Martinez and Rivera-
Alejandro.  Part IV of this note will show that the abolition of 
the death penalty has become a norm of regional customary law 
in the Latin American region and will argue that the U.S. At-
torney’s office violates these regional norms by imposing its 
views of capital punishment on a Latin population which has 
expressly and unequivocally rejected the ultimate punishment.  
I. PUERTO RICO’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO PUERTO 
RICO8 
On December 10, 1898, the United States and Spain signed 
the Treaty of Paris which officially ended the Spanish-American 
War.9  As a result of this treaty, the island of Puerto Rico be-
came a territory of the United States.10  In 1900, the Foraker 
Act11 introduced a civilian government on the island appointed 
by the U.S. President.12  The citizens of the island were not 
granted U.S. citizenship until the Jones Act of 191713 which also 
  
Penalty: History and Some Thoughts about the Department of Justice’s Role, 
26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 357 n.36 (1999)) (“Because violent crime is unfor-
tunately prevalent in Puerto Rico, the local authorities have entered into a 
‘Memorandum of Understanding’ with the local US Attorney’s office, agreeing 
that the federal authorities will prosecute much of the ‘local’ violent crime, 
such as car-jackings, in Puerto Rico.”). 
 8. See generally Malavet, supra note 5.  
 9. Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and the King-
dom of Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 1 P.R. LAWS ANN. 16 (1999). 
 10. Id. at art. 2 (“Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico 
and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the 
island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.”). 
 11. Foraker Act, ch. 191, 131 Stat. 77 (1900), 1 P.R. LAWS ANN. 24–48 
(1999).  
 12. Malavet, supra note 5, at 24.  The members of the local cabinet were 
also appointed by the President, as well as the Chief Justice and Associate 
Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.  Id. 
 13. Jones Act of 1917, ch. 145, 39 Stat. 951, 953 (1917). 
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changed the local government rule and gave the governor of the 
island the right to appoint his cabinet, with the advice and con-
sent of the local senate.14  The new citizens, however, were not 
afforded the same constitutional protections as U.S.  citizens 
residing on the mainland.15  
Thirty-three years after the Jones Act, on July 3, 1950, the 
U.S. Congress passed Public Law 600.16  The act was “adopted 
in the nature of a compact so that the people of Puerto Rico may 
organize a government pursuant to a constitution of their own 
adoption.”17  It purported to “fully” recognize “the principle of 
government by consent.”18  Public Law 600 was submitted to the 
people of Puerto Rico and accepted by them in a referendum 
held on June 4, 1951.19  Pursuant to Public Law 600, a constitu-
tional convention convened in Puerto Rico and adopted a consti-
tution which was approved by Congress on July 3, 1952.20  
In March 1953, the United States sent a memorandum to the 
Secretary General of the United Nations regarding Puerto 
Rico’s new status.21  The memorandum stated that “at the re-
quest of the people of Puerto Rico and with the approval of the 
Government of the United States, Puerto Rico has voluntarily 
entered into the relationship with the United States that it has 
chosen to describe as a ‘commonwealth’ relationship.”22  The 
memorandum stated that because of Puerto Rico’s new status 
and based on the principles of self-determination and govern-
ment by consent, the United States was no longer required to 
  
 14. Malavet, supra note 5, at 27.  
 15. Id.  For example, in Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that the right to trial by jury did not apply to U.S. 
citizens residing in Puerto Rico.  Balzac v. People of Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 
309 (1922). 
 16. Act of July 3, 1950, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. 
 19. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 313.  
 20. Public Law 447, July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327, reprinted in 1 P.R. 
LAWS ANN. 138–39 (1999). 
 21. Memorandum by the government of the United States of America Con-
cerning the Cessation of Transmission of Information under Article 73(e) of 
the Charter with Regard to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Apr. 20, 1953, 
Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 1953, at 584–85 [hereinafter Memoran-
dum Concerning Transmission of Information].  See also Malavet, supra note 
5, at 35.  
 22. Memorandum Concerning Transmission of Information, supra note 21.  
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report information concerning Puerto Rico to the United Na-
tions, in compliance with Article 73(e) of the United Nations 
Charter.23  The General Assembly of the United Nations subse-
quently passed a resolution accepting the new U.S. position re-
garding its reporting requirements under the Charter.24 
Before Puerto Rico officially became a commonwealth of the 
United States, it passed a law in 1929 abolishing capital pun-
ishment.25  Puerto Rico thereafter enshrined the prohibition in 
its highest document, its Constitution, in 1952.26  Although 
Congress had amended the Constitution of Puerto Rico before 
approving it and returning it for ratification by the citizens of 
Puerto Rico, it allowed the phrase “The death penalty shall not 
exist” to remain in the text of the Constitution.27  
  
 23. See id.; the United Nations Charter art. 73 states:  
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibili-
ties for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet 
attained a full measure of self-government, recognize the principle 
that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are para-
mount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the 
utmost, within the system of international peace and security estab-
lished by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of 
these territories, and, to this end: … (e) to transmit regularly to the 
Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limita-
tion as security and constitutional considerations may require, statis-
tical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, 
social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are 
respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chap-
ters XII and XIII apply. 
U.N. CHARTER art. 73.  
 24. Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73(e) of the 
Charter in respect of Puerto Rico, G.A. Res. 748, U.N. GAOR, 8th Sess., Supp. 
No. 17, at 25–26, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953).  
 25. 34 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 995 (1929).  
 26. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7. 
 27. Malavet, supra note 5, at 33.  According to Malavet: 
The amendments provided: (1) that students in private schools were 
exempt from the compulsory public education requirement of Article 
II, section 5, of the Puerto Rico constitution; (2) that Article II, sec-
tion 20, of the proposed Puerto Rico constitution – a declaration of 
Human Rights – should be eliminated; and (3) that Article VII, sec-
tion 3, should have added to it language that essentially would re-
quire Congressional approval of amendments to the Puerto Rico con-
stitution.  
Id.  
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The applicability of Federal legislation to Puerto Rico is gov-
erned by the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act (PRFRA).28  As 
provided in Public Law 600, many provisions of the Jones Act of 
1917 were repealed.29  The remaining provisions remained in 
force as the PRFRA pursuant to the compact between Puerto 
Rico and the United States Congress.30  Section 9 of the PRFRA 
states in pertinent part that “the statutory laws of the United 
States not locally inapplicable, except as hereinbefore or here-
inafter otherwise provided, shall have the same force and effect 
in Puerto Rico as in the United States.”31  
Section 9 has engendered a vast amount of litigation with 
seemingly inconsistent results.32  In United States v. Quiñones,33 
the first case in a line of challenges to the applicability of Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act34 (Omni-
bus Act) to the citizens of Puerto Rico, the First Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the applicability of the Omnibus Act to Puerto 
Rico.35  In Quiñones, the defendant challenged on appeal the 
applicability of the Omnibus Act’s provision authorizing “a per-
son acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral or elec-
tronic communication”36 between a government informant and a 
  
 28. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act, 64 Stat. 319 (1954) (codified in scat-
tered sections of 48 U.S.C.). 
 29. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 315. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act § 9, 48 U.S.C. § 734 (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1987) 
(Clean Water Act applicable); United States v. Quiñones, 758 F. 2d 40 (1st 
Cir. 1985) (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act applicable even in 
light of Puerto Rico’s constitutional ban on wiretapping); United States v. 
Tursi, 655 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1981) (Youth Corrections Act applicable); Liquilux 
Gas Services of Ponce v. Tropical Gas Co., 303 F. Supp. 414 (D. Puerto Rico 
1969) (Robinson-Patman Act not applicable); Trigo Bros. Packing Corp. v. 
Davis, 159 F. Supp. 841 (D. Puerto Rico 1958) (Federal Alcohol Administra-
tion Act not applicable); United States v. Figueroa-Rios, 140 F. Supp. 376 (D. 
Puerto Rico 1956) (Federal Firearms Act not applicable). 
 33. Quiñones, 758 F.2d at 43 (defendant appealed his conviction of aiding 
and abetting in the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The court 
held that “[t]he Omnibus Crime Control Act is the controlling law for federal 
prosecutions in Puerto Rico” and that “[t]he evidence of the recorded telephone 
conversation was properly admitted.”). 
 34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (2000). 
 35. Quiñones, 758 F.2d at 43.  
 36. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (2000). 
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criminal suspect.37  The court rejected Quiñones’ argument that 
the Constitution of Puerto Rico should be viewed as a federal 
statute and that its prohibition against wiretapping should con-
trol “because it has the force of federal law.”38  The court con-
cluded, instead, that the “intent behind the approval of the 
Puerto Rico Constitution was that the Constitution would oper-
ate to organize a local government and its adoption would in no 
way alter the applicability of United States laws and federal 
jurisdiction to Puerto Rico.”39 
The same issue of the applicability of Title III of the Omnibus 
Act to the citizens of Puerto Rico was revisited in subsequent 
cases.40  In United States v. Gerena,41 the court once again ruled 
that Title III of the Omnibus Act was not locally inapplicable to 
Puerto Rico.  In the process, however, the court acknowledged 
that all federal law does not automatically apply to Puerto 
Rico.42  The court concluded that federal laws would be locally 
inapplicable to Puerto Rico in matters concerning purely local 
issues.43  
Finally, in 1989, the First Circuit revisited the issue, this 
time in a civil context.  In Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos 
de Puerto Rico, the plaintiffs, some of the criminal defendants 
in the Gerena case, sued two corporations that had assisted fed-
eral authorities in wiretapping the plaintiffs’ telephone calls.44  
In its decision, once again upholding the applicability of Title 
III of the Omnibus Act to Puerto Rico, the court nonetheless 
noted that the “prohibition of wiretapping is an integral and 
indispensable part of the definition of Puerto Ricans as a people 
and a cornerstone of cultural values.”45  The court then stated 
  
 37. Quiñones, 758 F.2d at 40.  
 38. Id. at 41. 
 39. Id. at 43.  
 40. See generally  Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868 
F.2d 482 (1st Cir. 1989) (civil case in which the court once again upheld the 
validity of the application of Title III to Puerto Rico); United States v. Gerena, 
649 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Conn. 1986). 
 41. Gerena, 649 F. Supp. at 1183.  
 42. Id. at 1186–87. 
 43. Id. at 1187. 
 44. Camacho, 868 F.2d at 484. 
 45. Id. at 486. See also Sean M. Morton, Death isn’t Welcome Here: Evalu-
ating the Federal Death Penalty in the Context of a State Constitutional Objec-
tion to Capital Punishment, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1435, 1452 (2001).  
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that Puerto Rico’s Constitution should be viewed as the equiva-
lent of a state statute and that in matters in which federal and 
state law conflict, federal law must govern.46  
In part, as a result of these court decisions construing Section 
9 to allow for the application to Puerto Rico of federal statutes 
that conflict with the Commonwealth’s Constitution, federal 
prosecutors in Puerto Rico continue to seek the death penalty in 
cases arising mostly under the jurisdiction conferred to the fed-
eral courts by the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994.47  
II. THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1994 
The Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (FDPA) was passed as 
part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1993.48  For the first time since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Furman v. Georgia,49 the national government created a new set 
of procedural rules for implementing the federal death pen-
alty.50  Along with the new procedural guidelines, the FDPA 
also created new substantive crimes. 51 It also attached the 
death penalty to crimes which previously did not include death 
as a possible penalty.52 
A.  The New Procedural Guidelines of the FDPA 
1.  Notice of Intention to Seek the Death Penalty 
The FDPA leaves the decision of whether to seek the death 
penalty to the federal prosecutor’s discretion, based on the par-
  
 46. Camacho, 868 F.2d at 488. 
 47. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 312, n.1 (citing Little, supra note 
7, at 357 n.36 (“Because violent crime is unfortunately prevalent in Puerto 
Rico, the local authorities have entered into a ‘Memorandum of Agreement’ 
with the local US Attorney’s office, agreeing that the federal authorities will 
prosecute much of the ‘local’ violent crime, such as car-jackings, in Puerto 
Rico.”)). 
 48. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 
103–322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).   
 49. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 50. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 108 Stat. 1959–68 (1994) (codified 
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591 et seq. and in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 51. Id. See also Morton, supra note 45, at 1440.  
 52. Id.  
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ticular circumstances of each case.53  Once the determination 
that the death penalty is the appropriate punishment for a de-
fendant is made, the government must provide the court and 
the defendant with notice that it intends to seek the death pen-
alty.54  Such notice must be provided within a “reasonable” time 
before the beginning of the trial or before the court accepts a 
guilty plea.55  It must also include the aggravating factors that 
the prosecution will seek to prove in order to justify a death 
sentence.56  The District Court of Puerto Rico held in United 
States v. Colon-Miranda57 that the prosecution did not file its 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty within a reasonable 
time, where such notice was filed less than a week before the 
trial was set to begin and the government had no justification 
for its delay.58  Furthermore, the court took into account the fact 
that the defendants would be prejudiced because they would be 
unable to prepare an effective defense.59 
2. The Sentencing Hearing 
Once the government has filed its notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty and the defendant has been found guilty at trial 
of the capital crime(s) charged, the FDPA mandates a sentenc-
ing hearing.60  The sentencing hearing is to be conducted before 
the same jury that determined the defendant’s guilt or, under 
special circumstances, before a new jury.61  Ultimate discretion 
as to the convicted defendant’s sentence rests with the jury.62  
At the sentencing hearing, the jury must make a threshold find-
  
 53. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000).  See also Nichols v. Reno, 931 F. Supp. 
748, 752 (D.Colo. 1996) (“The death penalty statute gives prosecutorial discre-
tion to the United States Attorney.”). 
 54. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). 
 55. Id. 
 56. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a)(2). 
 57. United States v. Colon-Miranda, 985 F. Supp. 36 (D.P.R. 1997). 
 58. Id. at 39.   
 59. Id. 
 60. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b).  
 61. Id. 
 62. See 18 U.S.C. § 3594 (2000).  See also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 
609 (2002) (the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial 
by jury precludes a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, from finding an 
aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty). 
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ing of at least one aggravating factor out of a list of four statu-
torily-defined factors.63  The jury must find that the defendant:  
(A) intentionally killed the victim; or 
(B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in 
the death of the victim; or 
(C) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the 
life of a person would be taken or intending that lethal force 
would be used in connection with a person, other than one of 
the participants in the offense, and the victim died as a result 
of the act; or 
(D) intentionally and specifically engaged in an act of violence, 
knowing that the act created a grave risk of death to a person, 
other than one of the participants in the offense, such that 
participation in the act constituted a reckless disregard for 
human life and the victim died as a result of the act.64 
In addition to one of these four aggravating factors, the jury 
must also find at least one additional aggravating factor from 
among the lists of factors defined in section 3592 of the FDPA.65  
The prosecution may only present evidence as to the aggravat-
ing factors for which it has given notice to the defendant.66  The 
government must select its aggravating factors from one of 
three lists, depending on the type of crime that was commit-
ted.67  The aggravating factors for the homicide offenses include 
sixteen factors, three for espionage or treason and eight for the 
drug-related offenses.68 
  
 63. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (2000). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2000).  
 66. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (“[T]he government may present any information 
relevant to an aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under 
subsection (a).”).   
 67. 18 U.S.C. § 3592.  
 68. Id.  Some of the factors for the homicide offenses are: when death oc-
curs during the commission of another crime, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(1); grave 
risk of death to additional persons, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(5); heinous, cruel, or 
depraved manner of committing offense, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(6); and continu-
ing criminal enterprise involving drug sales to minors, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(13).  
Some of the factors for the drug-related offenses are: a previous serious drug 
felony conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(d)(3); use of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 
3592(d)(4); and distribution to persons under 21, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(d)(5).  The 
three aggravating factors for espionage or treason are: (1) prior espionage or 
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In addition to these statutorily-defined aggravating factors, 
the jury may also consider the existence of any other non-
statutorily defined factors for which the government has given 
notice.69  At the hearing, the government has the burden of 
proving these aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, to 
every juror.70  On the other hand, the burden of establishing the 
existence of any mitigating factors rests on the defense.71  Fur-
thermore, such factors must be proved only by a preponderance 
of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt.72  
Section 3593 of the FDPA also provides the procedural guide-
lines to be followed at the sentencing hearing. As during the 
trial, “the government shall open the argument [,] the defen-
dant shall be permitted to reply [and] the government shall 
then be permitted to reply in rebuttal.”73  The rules applicable to 
the admissibility of evidence during trial do not apply to the 
sentencing hearing.74  The FDPA specifies that parties may pre-
  
treason offense; or (2) grave risk to national security; or (3) grave risk of 
death, 18 U.S.C. § 3592(b)(1)-(3).  Id.   
 69. 18 U.S.C. § 3592.  Several courts have considered the constitutionality 
of non-statutory aggravating factors.  In United States v. Llera Plaza, the 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that the “non-
statutory aggravating factors [of the Federal Death Penalty Act] do not un-
constitutionally limit and guide [the] discretion of the jury [so as to permit] 
wholly arbitrary and capricious death sentences in violation of the Eight and 
Fourteenth Amendments.”  179 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 70. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).   
 71. Id.  Carter and Kreitzberg define mitigation evidence as follows: 
Offered in the penalty phase, evidence of mitigation provides reasons 
why the defendant should not be sentenced to death. Mitigating evi-
dence comes in many varieties. For example, the defense might em-
phasize that the defendant played a minor role in the crime, the de-
fendant had no prior criminal record, the defendant has lasting ef-
fects from an abusive childhood, the defendant has an underlying 
mental disorder, the youth of the defendant, the defendant is re-
morseful for the crime, or that the defendant can live peaceably in 
prison. As an element of the selection decision, mitigation allows for 
the individualized consideration of the defendant. The life and cir-
cumstances of each defendant are considered in deciding whether 
death or life is the appropriate sentence for a particular individual.  
LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
LAW 137 (2004). 
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).  
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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sent any evidence that is relevant to the sentence, and that both 
parties will be given a fair opportunity to develop their argu-
ments pertaining to any mitigating or aggravating factors.75  
The guidelines also specify the exclusion of evidence if “its pro-
bative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.”76 
At the close of the sentencing hearing, the jury is required to 
weigh the aggravating and the mitigating factors.77  The jurors 
may impose a sentence of death, life imprisonment without pa-
role, or another lesser sentence.  If the jury opts for some other 
sentence, the FDPA authorizes the judge to sentence the defen-
dant to some lesser sentence78 according to federal sentencing 
guidelines.79  The FDPA also requires that the death sentence 
determination be by unanimous vote of the jurors.80 
  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e).  This section states: 
[T]he jury, or if there is no jury, the court, shall consider whether all 
the aggravating factor or factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh 
all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify a sentence 
of death, or in the absence of a mitigating factor, whether the aggra-
vating factor or factors alone are sufficient to justify a sentence of 
death. 
Id.  In this respect, the FDPA is a weighing statute, which, instead of prevent-
ing the imposition of the death penalty in the presence of a mitigating factor, 
allows the jurors to weigh the aggravating factors against the mitigating fac-
tors when deciding whether to impose a sentence of death.  Charles C. Boet-
tcher, Note, Testing the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 USC §§ 3591-
3598 (1994): United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998), 29 TEX. TECH 
L. REV. 1043, 1072 (1998).  
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 3594. 
 79. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3595 sets out the guidelines for appeal by a defendant 
sentenced to death. 18 U.S.C. § 3595 (2000).  For a discussion of the process of 
appellate review, as well as a discussion of a fairly recent challenge to the 
FDPA, see generally Boettcher, supra note 77.  
 80. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (“[T]he jury by unanimous vote, or if there is no 
jury, the court, shall recommend whether the defendant should be sentenced 
to death, to life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other 
lesser sentence.”). 
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B. Crimes Subject to the Federal Death Penalty 
The Federal Death Penalty Act is applicable to three catego-
ries of crimes.81 First, the FDPA creates entirely new federal 
offenses, such as murder by a federal prisoner and use of weap-
ons of mass destruction.82  Second, the FDPA authorizes the 
death penalty for pre-existing federal offenses which were not 
previously punishable by death.83  Finally, the FDPA applies its 
  
 81. Boettcher, supra note 77, at 1058 (“It has been said that the FDPA 
created over sixty new death eligible crimes. However, the FDPA did not cre-
ate sixty death eligible crimes, but actually created only around twenty new 
death eligible crimes.”).  Boettcher clarifies that while the FDPA did create a 
few federal crimes, its major effect was to make its procedural provisions ap-
plicable to existing federal offenses, making them eligible for a penalty of 
death.  Id.  
 82. Little, supra note 7, at 391 n.237.  Other newly-created federal offenses 
include: 
[D]rive-by shooting, § 60008 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 36 (1994)); for-
eign murder of U.S. nationals, § 60009, 108 Stat. 1972 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1119 (1994)); murder by escaped [life] prisoners, § 60012, 
108 Stat. 1973 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1120 (1994)); killing persons 
assisting federal investigations, § 60015, 108 Stat. 1974 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1121 (1994)); retaliatory killings of witnesses, victims, 
and informants, § 60017, 108 Stat. 1975 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
1513(a) (1994)); violence against maritime navigation and fixed plat-
forms, § 60019, 108 Stat. 1975–79 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2280, 2281 
(1994)); violence at international airports, § 60021, 108 Stat. 1979–80 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 37 (1994)).  
Id. 
 83. Id.  Some of these pre-existing offenses include: 
Civil rights offenses and conspiracies, § 60006, 108 Stat. 1970–71, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245(b), 247(c) (1994) (focused on religious persecu-
tion); murder of a federal law enforcement official, § 60007, 108 Stat. 
1971, 18 U.S.C § 1114 (1994); sexual abuse and child molestation, § 
60010, 108 Stat. 1972–1973, 18 U.S.C. § 2245 (1994) (penalty); sexual 
exploitation of children, § 60011, 108 Stat. 1973, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d) 
(1994); gun murders during crimes of violence or drug trafficking, § 
60013, 108 Stat. 1973, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994) (penalty); posses-
sion of dangerous weapons in, or attack upon, a federal facility, § 
60014, 108 Stat. 1973, 18 U.S.C. § 930 (1994); obstruction of justice 
(“protection of court officers and jurors”), § 60016, 108 Stat. 1974, 18 
U.S.C. § 1503 (1994); murder of federal witnesses, § 60018, 108 Stat. 
1975, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(2)(A) (1994); terrorist death penalty act. § 
60022, 108 Stat. 1980, 18 U.S.C. § 2232(a)(1) (1994); and, alien 
smuggling, § 60024, 108 Stat. 1981–82, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1994). 
Id. at 391 n.238.  
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procedural guidelines to crimes which were previously eligible 
for the death penalty but whose death penalty provisions had 
been invalidated by the decision in Furman.84  These death pen-
alty provisions had never been removed from the Code nor 
amended.  The FDPA effectively brought them back to life.85 
III. A CHALLENGE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE FDPA TO 
PUERTO RICO: THE ACOSTA-MARTINEZ CASES 
The applicability of the FDPA to the citizens of Puerto Rico 
was challenged by two federal defendants charged with capital 
murder under the FDPA.86  The District Court of Puerto Rico 
granted the defendants’ motion to strike the death penalty cer-
tification based on the fact that, inter alia, Congress did not 
make the FDPA explicitly applicable to Puerto Rico.87  The First 
Circuit, however, reversed the District Court’s decision, and 
found that the statutes defining the substantive crimes the de-
fendants were charged with explicitly applied to Puerto Rico.88  
While Judge Casellas of the District Court acknowledged in a 
footnote that “a germane issue would be whether customary 
international law forbids the application of capital punishment 
in Puerto Rico,”89 neither the District Court nor the Circuit 
Court considered whether the application of the federal death 
penalty to citizens of Puerto Rico violates any norm of regional 
customary law. 
  
 84. Boettcher, supra note 77, at 1058–59.  Boettcher states: 
Approximately seventeen of these referenced crimes were already eli-
gible for imposition of the death penalty prior to the enactment of the 
FDPA. The statutes which make these crimes eligible for death, ap-
propriately referred to as “zombie statutes” because of their dormant 
nature after Furman, were effectively revived from their “Never-
Never Land” by the FDPA…Although the FDPA did make some new 
crimes death eligible, its most impacting effect on federal death pen-
alty jurisprudence is its codification of procedures for the imposition 
of the death penalty which comport with the constitutional require-
ments outlined by the Supreme Court. 
Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d 311. 
 87. Id. at 318. 
 88. United States v. Acosta Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) [here-
inafter Acosta Martinez II]. 
 89. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 313 n.6. 
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A.  Background of the Acosta-Martinez Cases 
On June 2, 1999 defendants Hector Oscar Acosta-Martinez 
and Joel Rivera- Alejandro were charged with firearm murder 
in relation to a crime of violence90 and killing a person in re-
taliation for providing law enforcement officials with informa-
tion relating to the possible commission of a federal offense,91 
both punishable by death under the FDPA.92  Subsequent to the 
U.S. Attorney General’s authorization on January 24, 2000, the 
United States Attorney for the District of Puerto Rico filed the 
notice that the office intended to seek the death penalty in the 
event of a conviction.93 
On May 17, 2000 the defendants filed a motion to declare the 
federal death penalty inapplicable in Puerto Rico.  The defen-
dants argued, among other things, that the federal death pen-
alty is “locally inapplicable” to Puerto Rico under Section 9 of 
the PRFRA due to the Puerto Rico Constitution’s explicit ban on 
capital punishment.94  The defendants also argued that applying 
the federal death penalty to citizens of Puerto Rico would be 
unfair due to their lack of representation in enacting federal 
law and thus, their lack of consent to this law in particular.95  
B. The District Court of Puerto Rico Decision in Acosta-Martinez 
On July 17, 2000 District Court Judge Casellas granted 
Acosta-Martinez and Rivera-Alejandro’s motion to strike the 
death penalty certification.96  The district court based its deci-
  
 90. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (2000).  Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. 
Supp. 2d at 312. 
 91. In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1513(a)(1)(B) (2000).  Acosta Martinez I, 106 
F. Supp. 2d at 312. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 312.  The defendants’ other arguments included an argument 
that even if Puerto Rico’s Constitution were to be considered a federal statute, 
it could not be unilaterally altered by Congress.  The court rejected this argu-
ment by stating that the theory had been previously rejected by the court and 
by citing United States v. Quiñones, discussed supra.  The court, ruling for 
defendants based on their first and third arguments did not reach defendants’ 
fourth argument that applying the federal death penalty to Puerto Rico vio-
lated Article X of the Treaty of Paris, which guaranteed the inhabitants of 
Puerto Rico the freedom to exercise their religion. Id. at 312–13.   
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 327.  
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sion on two grounds.  First, the court cited the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ decision in United States v. Quiñones.97  How-
ever, the district court distinguished that case based on “two 
important elements.”98  The first element was “the fundamental 
principle that death is different.”99  The court, quoting from the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia,100 emphasized 
the uniqueness of the death penalty in its “irrevocability,” its 
“rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of 
criminal justice,” and its “absolute renunciation of all that is 
embodied in our concept of humanity.”101  The court distin-
guished the case before it from Quiñones on the ground that 
death is fundamentally and qualitatively different from any 
other type of punishment.102  As such, the court held that the 
administration of the death penalty requires a higher degree of 
fairness, consistency, and reliability.103 
Second, the court considered the language of the Federal 
Death Penalty Act and Congressional intent with regard to its 
applicability to Puerto Rico.104  It stated that, while the Omni-
bus Act at issue in Quiñones specifically extends to Puerto 
Rico,105 the FDPA does not.106  The court noted that while the 
Omnibus Act expressly mentions the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico in its definition of “state” for purposes of that act, the 
FDPA merely mentions Puerto Rico to include it “in a geo-
graphical sense” in the definition of “United States” for certain 
maritime offenses only.107  The court reasoned: 
However, on a matter as unique and extreme as the death 
penalty, the mention of Puerto Rico exclusively in the context 
  
 97. See discussion supra Part I. 
 98. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 317.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 101. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 318 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 
306 (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Omnibus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2000) (“[A]s used in this chapter 
‘state’ means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United 
States.”). 
 106. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
 107. Id. at 319. 
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of these maritime offenses, cannot reasonably be taken as Con-
gress’s manifest intention that the FDPA not fall within the 
“not locally inapplicable” provision set forth in section 9, par-
ticularly in view of the Commonwealth Constitution’s prohibi-
tion against capital punishment. The extraordinary nature of 
capital punishment requires a higher degree of clarity and 
precision. Reason and common sense dictate that had Con-
gress intended to apply the death penalty in the Common-
wealth, it would have done so by the plain declaration, and 
would not have left it to mere inference.108  
The court then went on to discuss the context in which the 
Commonwealth drafted and the U.S. Congress approved the 
Puerto Rican Constitution.109  The court noted that the Framers, 
in enshrining Puerto Rico’s prohibition of the death penalty in 
its highest document, were acting on the Puerto Rican people’s 
“firm cultural, moral and religious convictions.”110  Judge Casel-
las also noted that Congress conditioned its approval of the con-
stitution on several amendments, and that Congress had not 
required the elimination of Puerto Rico’s ban on the death pen-
alty embodied in Article 2, Section 7.111  Therefore, Puerto Rican 
citizens’ expectations that the death penalty would not exist 
under the Puerto Rico-United States compact were reason-
able.112  
The court summarized its finding that the FDPA is inappli-
cable to Puerto Rico in five short points: (1) Commonwealth 
status was established in Puerto Rico in order to promote and 
develop self-government and enhance Puerto Rico’s autonomy; 
(2) by accepting Public Law 600, the people of Puerto Rico ac-
  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. at 319–20. 
 110. Id. at 320. 
 111. Id. at 320–21; Malavet, supra note 5, at 33.  Malavet states: 
The amendments provided: (1) that students in private schools were 
exempt from the compulsory public education requirement of Article 
II, section 5, of the Puerto Rico constitution; (2) that Article II, sec-
tion 20, of the proposed Puerto Rico constitution – a declaration of 
Human Rights – should be eliminated; and (3) that Article VII, sec-
tion 3, should have added to it language that essentially would re-
quire Congressional approval of amendments to the Puerto Rico con-
stitution.  
Id. 
 112. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 321. 
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cepted Section 9 of the PRFRA which makes clear that federal 
law that is not locally inapplicable, applies to Puerto Rico; (3) 
the Commonwealth’s Constitution explicitly prohibits the death 
penalty in Puerto Rico; (4) the culture, values and traditions of 
the Puerto Rican people all reject the death penalty; and (5) 
Congress did not explicitly extend the FDPA to Puerto Rico.113 
The district court went on to state that even if Congress ex-
plicitly declared its intent to make the FDPA applicable to 
Puerto Rico, such application “would not comport with the exi-
gencies of substantive due process.”114  The court then discussed 
in detail the history of the adoption of the Commonwealth Con-
stitution as embodying the principle of government by con-
sent.115  The court explained that, for the first time, through the 
compact and through Section 9 of the PRFRA, the Puerto Rican 
people agreed to be governed by federal laws that were not lo-
cally inapplicable even though they did not have any participa-
tion in their enactment.116  
In the case of Puerto Rican federal relations, the court said 
that the principle of government by consent is eroding because 
of the “widening sphere of federal authority, which has ex-
  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 321–22.  
 115. Id. at 322.  The court also remarked that the FDPA expressly acknowl-
edges the principle of government by consent by establishing special provi-
sions for Indian Country: 
No person subject to the criminal jurisdiction of an Indian tribal gov-
ernment shall be subject to a capital sentence under this chapter for 
any offense the Federal jurisdiction for which is predicated solely on 
Indian country…and which has occurred within the boundaries of In-
dian country, unless the governing body of the tribe has elected that 
this chapter have effect over land and persons subject to its criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Id. at 325 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3598 (2000) (emphasis in original)).   
 116. Id. at 322.  The Court pointed out that:  
Puerto Ricans residing in Puerto Rico do not vote for the President of 
the United States, nor do they elect senators or representatives to the 
United States Congress, except for a non-voting Resident Commis-
sioner for Puerto Rico who sits in the House of Representatives. The 
Resident Commissioner can vote in the Congressional committees to 
which he is assigned, see Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule 
XII, but he cannot cast a final vote on legislation proposed in the 
House. 
Id. at 322 n.37.  
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panded without local participation, and the concomitant reduc-
tion in the sphere of commonwealth authority.”117  The court 
then differentiated between applying, on the basis of the “ge-
neric consent” given in Section 9 of the PRFRA, federal laws 
aimed at furthering the common good118 and a federal law which 
allows for the “deprivation of life.”119  The court held that the 
latter application is unreasonable, unfair, directly cuts against 
the principle of government by consent, violates the substantive 
due process rights of the American citizens of Puerto Rico,120 
and “constitutes a violation of the fundamental rights to liberty 
and life of the American citizens of Puerto Rico.”121  The court 
ultimately granted the defendants’ motion to strike the death 
penalty certification and the prosecution appealed that decision 
to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.  
C. The First Circuit’s Decision in Acosta-Martinez 
After holding that it had appellate jurisdiction to hear the 
case before it,122 the First Circuit Court of Appeals considered 
the issue of whether Congress intended the federal death pen-
alty to apply to Puerto Rico.123  The Court of Appeals found that 
the district court erred in focusing on the language of the FDPA 
rather than on the language of the substantive statutes which 
define the crimes with which the defendants were charged.124  
  
 117. Id. at 324.  
 118. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 326 n.47.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d 1515 (1st Cir. 1987) (Clean Water Act); Caribtow v. 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Com’n, 493 F.2d 1064 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(Occupational Safety and Health Act).  
 119. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 326.  
 120. Id. at 325. 
 121. Id. at 326 (emphasis in original). 
 122. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 16–17.  The court held that it had ju-
risdiction to review the district court’s order under the Criminal Appeals Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 3731.  Id.  According to the court of appeals, the district court had, 
by striking a statutorily authorized penalty, “effectively dismissed a signifi-
cant portion of the counts against the defendants.”  Id. at 17.  The court also 
noted that the district court’s order affected more than merely the sentence; it 
materially affected the conduct of trial.  Id.  The court also concluded that the 
case before it also fell under its mandamus jurisdiction.  Id.  
 123. Id. at 15.  
 124. Id. at 19.  The court stated that while it accepted “the strength of 
Puerto Rico’s interest and its moral and cultural sentiment against the death 
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The FDPA, the court said, does not provide for the death pen-
alty in and of itself.125  Instead, it merely provides a set of proce-
dural rules to be followed before capital punishment is im-
posed.126  As the source of the penalty, the court instead looked 
to the substantive statutes which define the crimes and their 
punishments.127 
The court first looked at the language of 18 U.S.C. §924(j) un-
der which the defendants were charged with firearm murder in 
relation to a crime of violence, then at 18 U.S.C. §1515(a)(1)(B), 
the basis for the defendant’s retaliatory killing charge.128  The 
court noted that both provisions punish those crimes with pen-
alties that include the death penalty and that both crimes “and 
the consequent penalties are explicitly made applicable to 
Puerto Rico.”129  The court cited 18 U.S.C. §921130 as evidence 
that the firearms murder offense is explicitly applicable to 
Puerto Rico and cited 18 U.S.C. §1513(d)131 to show that “the 
retaliatory killing offense applies not only within the United 
States, but also explicitly has “extraterritorial reach.”132  Addi-
tionally, the court stated that the federal criminal code itself is 
explicitly made applicable to Puerto Rico because the territorial 
  
penalty; the legal issue for the court is still one of what Congress intended.”  
Id. 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. 
 129. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 19. 
 130. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) states: 
The term “interstate or foreign commerce” includes commerce be-
tween any place in a State and any place outside of that State, or 
within any possession of the United States (not including the Canal 
Zone) or the District of Columbia, but such term does not include 
commerce between places within the same State but through any 
place outside of that State. The term “state” includes the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the possessions of 
the United States (not including the Canal Zone. 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2) (2000). 
 131. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1513(d) states that 
“there is extraterritorial Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this sec-
tion.”  18 U.S.C. § 1513(d) (2000). 
 132. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 19. 
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definition of United States, for the purposes of the criminal 
codes, expressly includes Puerto Rico.133 
The court further stated that the fact that Congress included 
Puerto Rico in its definition of state in the new maritime of-
fenses it enacted along with the FDPA is also indicative of Con-
gressional “intent to apply the death penalty in the statutes 
which define the crime and penalty and not in a procedural 
statute.”134  As the constitutions of the fifty states only govern 
proceedings in state courts, so, too, the Constitution of Puerto 
Rico only governs matters in the Commonwealth courts.  Ac-
cordingly, the court concluded that Congress intended that the 
federal death penalty apply to federal criminal prosecutions in 
Puerto Rico.135  
The court then turned to the district court’s constitutional de-
termination that the application of the federal death penalty to 
U.S. citizens who reside in Puerto Rico violated defendants’ 
substantive due process rights.136  The court claimed that the 
“shocking to the conscience test”137 used to test executive action 
was not met in this case.138  The court cited a string of cases 
which held federal law applicable to Puerto Rico and then 
stated that “it cannot shock the conscience of the court to apply 
to Puerto Rico, as intended by Congress, a federal penalty for a 
federal crime which Congress has applied to the fifty states.”139  
The court went on to say that with the power to apply federal 
criminal laws to Puerto Rico comes the power to attach penal-
  
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 20. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 21. The Court in Furman explained that:  
In judging whether or not a given penalty is morally acceptable, most 
courts have said that the punishment is valid unless it shocks the 
conscience and sense of justice of the people… [W]hether or not a 
punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere 
mention shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people, but 
on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the 
penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, 
and unacceptable. 
Furman, 408 U.S. at 360–61.  
 138. Acosta Martinez II, 252 F.3d at 21.       
 139. Id. 
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ties to them.140  The court also found that it would be anomalous 
to grant U.S. citizenship to the people of Puerto Rico without 
affording them the protection of the federal criminal laws.141  
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE FDPA TO PUERTO RICO AS A 
VIOLATION OF REGIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
While there are differing views as to whether abolition of the 
death penalty has become a norm of customary international 
law,142 there is ample evidence to suggest that it has at the least 
become a norm of regional customary law in the Latin American 
region.143  Latin American countries have been at the forefront 
of the movement towards universal abolition of the death pen-
alty,144 and the evidence strongly suggests that these countries 
have engaged in the practice of abolition with the opinio juris145 
necessary for the development of a norm of regional customary 
law.146  On this basis, the application of the Federal Death Pen-
alty to citizens of Puerto Rico clearly violates regional custom-
ary law.  
A.  Customary International Law in Brief 147 
The Restatement Third of Foreign Relations Law § 102 de-
fines a rule of international law as one “that has been accepted 
as such by the international community of states (a) in the form 
of customary international law; (b) by international agreement; 
or (c) by derivation from general principles common to the ma-
jor legal systems of the world.”148  The Restatement further ex-
  
 140. Id. at 20. 
 141. Id. at 21. 
 142. See generally WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed. 2002) 
(1993); Michelle McKee, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: Understand-
ing why the State’s Use of the Death Penalty Violates Customary International 
Law, 6 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 153 (2000).  
 143. See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 144. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 311. 
 145. See definition of opinio juris infra Part IV.A.  
 146. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 147. See generally CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965).  
 148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(1) (1987).  See 
also Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice which 
provides:  
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plains that a binding rule of customary international law re-
sults from the consistent general practice of states,149 followed 
out of a sense of legal obligation.150 
The comments to Section 102 of the Restatement note that 
state practice may take numerous forms, and that there is no 
requisite duration for such practice as long as it is “general and 
consistent.”151  Different forms of state practice include “diplo-
matic contacts and correspondence; public statements of gov-
ernment officials; legislative and executive acts; military manu-
als and actions by military commanders; treaties and executive 
agreements; decisions of international and national courts and 
tribunals; and decisions, declarations, and resolutions of inter-
national organizations, among many others.”152 
  
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with interna-
tional law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, estab-
lishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of general practice accepted as 
law;  
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the deter-
mination of rules of law. 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 
1031.  
 149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).  The 
word “state” in the context of international law has been defined as follows: 
As stated in the 1933 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 
(the Montevideo Convention), concluded among 16 states in the 
Western hemisphere, “[t]he state as a person of international law 
should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent popula-
tion; b) a defined territory; c) government; d) capacity to enter into re-
lations with other states. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 109 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff et al. eds. 
2002). 
 150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).  
 151. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, cmt. b (1987).  
See also INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 74.   
 152. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 74 
(“State practice also includes inaction, at least in circumstances in which a 
state’s failure to object to actions by another state may imply acquiescence in 
those actions.”).   
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State practice alone does not constitute customary interna-
tional law.153  In order for a state practice to become a rule of 
customary international law, states that engage in the practice 
must do so out of a sense of legal obligation which is referred to 
as opinio juris sive necessitatis or simply opinio juris.154  Since 
states usually do not refer to international law when acting, it 
is necessary to infer the opinio juris from the circumstances and 
the nature of the state practice itself.155 
Finally, there are circumstances, such as those which exist 
with relation to the death penalty in the Latin American region, 
in which the practice of states within a regional or other special 
grouping can result in the existence of “special,” “regional” or 
“particular customary law” for those states.156 
B. The Abolition of the Death Penalty as a Norm of Regional 
Customary Law in the Latin American Region157 
The abolition of the death penalty has become a general and 
consistent practice among Latin American states.158  Some Latin 
  
 153. Id. at 75. 
 154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, cmt. c (1987); 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 75. 
 155. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 75.  
“It is often difficult to determine when the transformation into law has taken 
place. Explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official state-
ments) is not necessary; opinio juris may be inferred from acts or omissions.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, cmt. c (1987).  
 156. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102, cmt. e (1987). 
 157. There are differing views as to whether the abolition of the death pen-
alty has become a norm of customary international law.  For an overview of 
the current status of abolition in international law and for the view that the 
abolition of the death penalty has yet to reach the level of customary interna-
tional law, see generally SCHABAS, supra note 142.  See also Anthony N. 
Bishop, The Death Penalty in the United States: An International Human 
Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1147 (2002).  Bishop states: 
While 111 countries have abolished capital punishment de jure or de 
facto, it is still too soon to claim that the use of the death penalty in 
general is prohibited by customary international law. There are still 
large regions of the world where the death penalty is widely used 
even for the most minor offenses.  
Id.  For the argument that abolition of the death penalty is a norm of custom-
ary law and that the United States’ use of the death penalty violates that law, 
see Michelle McKee, supra note 142.  
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American states abolished the death penalty as early as the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century.159  In fact, 
Latin American states such as Uruguay and Venezuela have 
played a crucial role within the United Nations by advocating 
for the abolition of the death penalty.160  Many Latin American 
countries’ constitutions either limit the scope of the death pen-
alty or abolish it completely.161  According to a study by Roger 
Hood, “the hundred year tradition of abolition in South America 
now holds sway over almost all of the region.”162 
1. The American Convention on Human Rights163 
Drawing on the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights164 and the European Convention on Human 
Rights,165 the Organization of American States adopted the 
  
 158. See Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2 infra for a discussion of relevant state 
actions which amount to general practice under customary international law.  
 159. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 311.  Venezuela abolished the death pen-
alty in 1863, Costa Rica in 1877, Brazil in 1882, Panama in 1903, Ecuador in 
1906, Uruguay in 1907 and Colombia in 1910. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.  The language of some of these countries’ constitutions is as follows: 
Colombia (1886), art. 29: “The legislature may not impose capital 
punishment in any case;” Costa Rica (1871), art. 45: “Human life is 
inviolable in Costa Rica;” Ecuador (1946), art. 187: “The state shall 
guarantee to the inhabitants of Ecuador: (1) the sanctity of human 
life: there shall be no death penalty;” Panama (1946), art. 30: “There 
is no penalty of death, expatriation, or confiscation of property;” Uru-
guay (1934), art. 25: “The penalty of death shall not be inflicted on 
any person.” 
Id. at n.3.  
 162. ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY, A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE 43–44 
(2nd ed. 1996) cited in SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 311.  
 163. For a discussion of some of the decisions of the Inter American Court 
and commissions regarding the death penalty and for a general discussion of 
the Inter American Human Rights System, see generally SCHABAS, supra note 
142, and Richard J. Wilson, The United States’ Position on the Death Penalty 
in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1159 
(2002). 
 164. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 
3rd Sess., pt. 1, Resolutions at 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). 
 165. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man166 in 
1948, followed by the American Convention on Human Rights167 
in the late 1960’s.168  In all, through Article 4 of the American 
Convention, international law prohibits sixteen Central and 
South American states from imposing the death penalty.169  In-
spired by the above-mentioned documents, Article 4 states: 
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This 
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the mo-
ment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
life. 
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it 
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and pursuant 
to a final judgment rendered by a competent court and in ac-
cordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted 
prior to the commission of the crime. The application of such 
punishment shall not be extended to crimes to which it does 
not presently apply. 
3. The death penalty shall not be reestablished in states that 
have abolished it. 
4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political 
offenses or related common crimes.  
5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons 
who, at the time the crime was committed, were under 18 
years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be applied to 
pregnant women.170  
6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to 
apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence, which 
may be granted in all cases. Capital punishment shall not be 
  
 166. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Mar. 30-May 2, 
1948, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L./V/I.4 (1965). 
 167. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
123, O.A.S.T.S. 36 (1979). 
 168. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 312. 
 169. Id. at 353.  
 170. For the argument that the United States is in breach of international 
law, see Rachel J. Avery, “Killing Kids Who Kill” – An International Perspec-
tive on the Juvenile Death Penalty, 7 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 303 
(2002-2003).   The Supreme Court recently held that the execution of juveniles 
is unconstitutional.  See generally Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.  Ct. 1183 (2005) 
(holding execution of juveniles unconstitutional). 
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imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the com-
petent authority.171  
Although inspired by previously adopted international in-
struments,172 the American Declaration’s standards on the 
death penalty are much more radical than those of its predeces-
sors.173 In fact, the drafters of the Convention were the first to 
promote the idea of implementing an additional protocol that 
would altogether abolish the death penalty in the region.174 
   
2. The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty 
In 1990, the Inter-American human rights system of the Or-
ganization of American States adopted and later gave effect to 
the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty.175  The Protocol states in 
part: 
The State Parties to this Protocol  
Considering: 
That Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
recognizes the right to life and restricts the application of the 
death penalty; 
That everyone has the inalienable right to respect for his life, 
a right that cannot be suspended for any reason; 
  
 171. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 167, at art. 4. 
 172. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights merely states: “Everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.” Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, supra note 164, at art. 3.  Article 2 of the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms states 
“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of 
his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following 
his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”  European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
supra note 165.  
 173. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 350 (“By the inclusion of Article 4 § 3, the 
Convention is in fact abolitionist for those State parties – and they are the 
majority in the Organization of American States – that have abolished the 
death penalty in their internal legislation.”).  
 174. Id. 
 175. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to 
Abolish the Death Penalty, Aug. 28, 1991, 29 I.L.M. 1447, O.A.S.T.S. 73. 
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That the tendency among the American States is to be in fa-
vour of abolition of the death penalty; 
… 
That an international agreement must be arrived at that will 
entail a progressive development of the American Convention 
on Human Rights; and 
That States Parties to the American Convention on Human 
Rights have expressed their intention to adopt an interna-
tional agreement with a view to consolidating the practice of 
not applying the death penalty in the Americas. 
… 
Article 1 
The State parties to this Protocol shall not apply the death 
penalty in their territory to any person subject to their juris-
diction. 176 
  
The Protocol does not allow for reservations,177 except to re-
serve the right to apply the death penalty in wartime.178  The six 
countries that signed the protocol at adoption are Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela.179  To 
date, nine states have ratified the Protocol; the United States 
clearly not one of them.180 
  
 176. Id. 
 177. In the case where one or more states refuses to accept all of a treaty’s 
provisions while still wishing to become a party to a multilateral treaty, the 
state “may seek to enter a reservation to the treaty to limit or exclude the 
application of one or more of the treaty’s terms to the reserving state, provided 
that the treaty does not expressly prohibit the reservation at issue.”  
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 65. 
 178. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to 
Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 175, at art. 2(1). 
 179. Anthony N. Bishop, The Death Penalty in the United States: An Inter-
national Human Rights Perspective, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 1115, 1145 n.223 
(2002). 
 180. Organization of American States, Signatories and Ratifications of the 
Inter American Treaties, at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-53.html 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2005).   
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3. The Requisite Opinio Juris 
While the international agreements discussed above are dis-
positive evidence of a general and consistent practice of aboli-
tion of the death penalty among Latin American states, their 
widespread acceptance by Latin American countries is also evi-
dence that these states have acted with the requisite opinio ju-
ris necessary for the creation of a norm of customary law.  The 
mere fact that there remains only one Latin American country, 
Guatemala, which continues to employ the death penalty,181 is 
strong evidence that those states that have abolished the death 
penalty have done so out of a sense of legal obligation.  
The opinio juris for the abolition of the death penalty in Latin 
America can also be inferred from some of the language used in 
reservations to the treaties and in the language of the treaties 
themselves.182  In its reservation to the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the Dominican Republic stated that “[t]he Do-
minican Republic, upon signing the American Convention on 
Human Rights, aspires that the principle pertaining to the abo-
lition of the death penalty shall become purely and simply that, 
with general application throughout the states of the American 
Region.”183  It can be inferred from this language that the Do-
minican Republic, in signing onto the Convention, did so out of 
a sense of legal obligation and that it expected other countries 
in the American Region to subscribe to the principle now codi-
fied in the Convention that the death penalty ought to be abol-
ished. 
Furthermore, the language in the preamble of the Additional 
Protocol is also evidence of the necessary opinio juris.  It can be 
inferred from the statement that the “State Parties to the 
American Convention on Human Rights have expressed their 
intention to adopt an international agreement with a view to 
consolidating the practice of not applying the death penalty in 
the Americas”184 that the signatories were acting out of a sense 
  
 181. See McKee, supra note 142, at 159 (“It is also important to realize that 
among North America, South America, Central America and Western Europe; 
the United States, Guyana, Guatemala and Belize are the only non-conformist 
nations.”).  
 182. INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS, supra note 149, at 75.  
 183. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 436–37. 
 184. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to 
Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 175 (emphasis added). 
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of legal obligation and with the goal of codifying a practice that 
was already in existence among them.  
4. The United States Violates Regional Customary Law by Im-
posing the Death Penalty on the Citizens of Puerto Rico 
In 1953, in response to the United States Memorandum to 
the United Nations concerning the Cessation of Transmission of 
Information regarding Puerto Rico,185 the United Nations’ Gen-
eral Assembly passed Resolution 748. The resolution stated, in 
pertinent part, “that the agreement reached by the United 
States of America and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in 
forming a political association which respects the individuality 
and the cultural characteristics of Puerto Rico, maintains the 
spiritual bonds between Puerto Rico and Latin America and 
constitutes a link in continental solidarity.”186  
This resolution evidences the importance that the interna-
tional community places on the development of regional sys-
tems and on the incorporation into those systems of countries 
with similar cultures and beliefs.  The almost unanimous aboli-
tion of the death penalty in the Latin American region is a re-
sult of those countries’ moral, cultural, and religious respect for 
human life.187  As discussed supra, in incorporating the abolition 
of the death penalty into the Commonwealth’s Constitution, the 
Framers “were acting upon the people of Puerto Rico’s firm cul-
tural, moral and religious conviction against the death pen-
alty.”188  
By imposing the federal death penalty on the citizens of 
Puerto Rico, the United States has acted and continues to act in 
opposition to General Assembly Resolution 748.189  The United 
States continues to disregard the “individuality and cultural 
characteristics”190 that led Puerto Rico to definitively abolish the 
death penalty in its Constitution.  Furthermore, and most im-
  
 185. See Memorandum Concerning Transmission of Information, supra note 
21.  See also Malavet, supra note 5.   
 186. Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73(e) of the 
Charter in respect of Puerto Rico, supra note 24.  
 187. SCHABAS, supra note 142, at 350.  
 188. Acosta Martinez I, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 311.   
 189. Cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73 (e) of the 
Charter in respect of Puerto Rico, supra note 24. 
 190. Id.  
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portantly for the purposes of the present discussion, the United 
States is ignoring the “spiritual bond”191 or “link in continental 
solidarity”192 which exists between Puerto Rico and the rest of 
the Latin American region.  By continuously seeking the death 
penalty against citizens of Puerto Rico, the United States is vio-
lating the norm of regional customary law that has developed in 
the Latin American region, which upholds respect for the right 
to life and prohibits imposition of the death penalty.193  
CONCLUSION 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico states: 
“[s]e reconoce como derecho fundamental del ser humano el de-
recho a la vida, a la libertad, y al disfrute de la propiedad.  No 
existirá la pena de muerte.  Ninguna persona será privada de su 
libertad, o propiedad, sin el debido proceso de ley, ni se negará a 
persona alguna en Puerto Ricota igual protección de las le-
yes.”194 
The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, like so 
many of the constitutions of other Latin American countries,195 
clearly and explicitly prohibits the imposition of the death pen-
alty on its citizens.  In fact, as recently as 1991, the people of 
Puerto Rico once again expressed their abhorrence for the death 
penalty when they voted against a proposed constitutional 
amendment that would have changed § 7 of the Puerto Rico 
Constitution to allow for the death penalty in cases of repeat 
first degree murder and multiple murders committed during 
the same act.196  The rejection of the constitutional amendment 
by the people of Puerto Rico shows that Puerto Rico’s long-
  
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. 
 193. See discussion supra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2. 
 194. P.R. CONST. art. II, § 7 (“Recognizing the fundamental rights to life, 
liberty and property. The death penalty shall not exist. No person shall be 
deprived of liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any per-
son in Puerto Rico be denied equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added). 
 195. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
 196. Juan Alberto Soto Gonzalez & Juan Carlos Rivera Rodríguez, La Pena 
de Muerte, Una Batalla entre una Ley Federal y la Constitución de Puerto 
Rico, 41 REV. DER. P.R. 253, 257–58 (2002) (Title translates as “The Death 
Penalty, A Battle between a Federal Law and the Constitution of Puerto Ri-
co”). 
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standing sentiments against capital punishment remain very 
strong even in modern times.  
While the new procedural and sentencing guidelines intro-
duced by the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994197 effectively 
cure many of the constitutional problems denounced by the Su-
preme Court in Furman v. Georgia, they continue to defy and 
violate the will of the people of Puerto Rico as well as the norm 
of customary law developed in the Latin American Region.198  
The Supreme Court of the United States has yet to address the 
issue of the applicability of the FDPA to citizens of Puerto 
Rico,199 but will have to eventually, as the Department of Justice 
continues to seek the death penalty in a large number of federal 
prosecutions in Puerto Rico.200  
The Supreme Court, like the District Court of Puerto Rico 
and the First Circuit Court of Appeals,201 is likely to focus on 
domestic issues of applicability of federal legislation to Puerto 
Rico.  However, in order to comply with regional customary law, 
either Congress or the Court itself will have to address the is-
sue and declare the Federal Death Penalty Act inapplicable to 
Puerto Rico as a violation of regional customary law.    
        
                                        Monique Marie Gallien* 
 
  
 197. See discussion supra Part II. 
 198. See discussion supra Part IV.  
 199. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case of Acosta Martinez. 
Acosta-Martinez v. United States, 533 U.S. 906 (2002).  
 200. Little, supra note 7, at 357 n.36 (“The Puerto Rico U.S. Attorney’s office 
has submitted the largest number of potential death penalty cases (59) of any 
of the 94 federal districts since the Capital Case Review protocol was issued in 
1995.”).  
 201. See discussion of Acosta Martinez cases supra Part III.  
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